With resumption of the flight test program close at hand, Bell selected 23-year old Chalmers H. "Slick" Goodlin to replace Woolams as the XS-1 pilot. Handsome and engaging, Goodlin had enlist-ed in the Royal Canadian Air Force in 1941 and, after completing a combat tour flying Spitfires with the RCAF, he had subsequently served as a test and ferry pilot for the U.S. Navy. He had flown as a test pilot for Bell since January of 1944. By the time he was assigned to the XS-1 project, he had already acquired vast experience in high-performance aircraft and had earned a reputation as an outstanding "stick-and-rudder man." During the acceptance test program, Bell was contractually obligated only to test the craft and prove its flight worthiness out to 0.8 Mach. However, since it was common practice for contractor pilots to fly all of the early, hazardous envelope-expansion phases of test programs on new aircraft, there was at least reason to believe that, if he and the XS-1 survived, Goodlin might well proceed to fly the rest of the program up to, and including, the assault on Mach 1.

But first things first. The whole issue of who would make those flights--whether it would be a pilot from Bell, the NACA or some other organization--would not be settled for many months. For the present, Bell still had to complete the acceptance program. The company was under pressure from the AAF to complete the tests as quickly as possible so that the research program could get underway. In addition, Bell had its own motives for proceeding with haste. Like many other aircraft manufacturers caught up in the postwar drawdown, the company was facing a serious financial crisis and could ill afford the costs of conducting a long, drawn-out test program.

While the Pinecastle tests were still under-way, Bell had designated Richard H. "Dick" Frost as its project engineer for the XS-1 program. The 28-year old Frost had graduated with a degree in aeronautical engineering from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in 1940 and had joined Bell as a test pilot in July of 1943. Serious injuries incurred while bailing out of a burning P-63 in February of 1945 had curtailed his test piloting career and he had transitioned into the company’s experimental engineering programs. In late August, he outlined the remainder of Bell’s planned acceptance test program for the Engineering Division. Given the fact that the XS-1 was a highly experimental aircraft employing an exotic propulsion system, he explain-ed, it was impossible to provide a detailed, flight-by-flight plan. Decisions concerning the planned events for each flight would necessarily be based on what was encountered in previous flights. However, Bell was just as eager as the AAF to complete the program as quickly as possible and hence it would "make every effort to limit our flight tests at Muroc." On the issue of the controllability of the XS-1, for example, the company did not "envision any lengthy series of scientific tests to investigate all the byroads of stability in its various forms." It would, instead, accept its pilot’s judgment on the issue. While Bell wanted to cooperate with the NACA in its efforts to collect data, Frost reminded the AAF that the company’s engineering funds for the program were extremely constrained. Bell’s responsibility was to complete the acceptance tests as expeditiously as possible, not to engage in flight research. Thus, he explained:

We do not foresee the need for delaying any flight test, for instance, to permit detailed analysis of numerous data which the automatic instrumentation may have recorded the previous flight, nor delaying a flight because radar or telemetering, or say, a multiple manometer were not functioning 100 percent since none of those items have any bearing on our contractual commitments.

While this was acceptable to the AAF and certainly consistent with the approach already taken by Bell during the Pinecastle tests, it was certainly not in keeping with the kind of program the NACA had envisioned. The agency viewed the acceptance tests as the first phase of a detailed flight research program which, at this point, it still intended to conduct. Moreover, before it would be willing to proceed with the high-speed tests, the NACA wanted complete data--especially on air loads and stability and control. Always very guarded and deliberate in its approach to research projects, the NACA was especially sensitive to the risks involved in this program. Thus, in early June, Walt Williams had planned a very comprehensive and deliberately cautious flight research program for the XS-1 which was predicated upon obtaining complete data from a fully instrumented airplane during the contractor’s acceptance tests. And, in his memo transmitting that plan to NACA headquarters later that month, Henry J.E. Reid, the Engineer-in-Charge at Langley, had cautioned that "the tentative nature of this program should be stressed, as the progress is contingent on the findings of estimates which may be off several hundred percent." Williams reiterated both the NACA’s concerns and its requirements in meetings with Frost and Stanley at Bell’s Niagara Falls facility in mid-September. He was informed that, while Bell would attempt to assist the NACA in meeting its data requirements, the company would be satisfied with Goodlin’s judgments concerning stability and control and that no special data gathering flights would be scheduled nor would any delays in the flight test program be tolerated.

While conceding that it met the legal requirements of Bell’s contract with the AAF, this response was totally unacceptable to Reid. Thus, in late September, he informed NACA headquarters that Langley’s requirements for the acceptance test program included "systematic exploration of the stability and control characteristics and structural loading at successively higher speeds up to a Mach number of 0.8. This program," he continued, "is based on the understanding that before asking anyone to proceed with the extremely hazardous flying above a Mach number of 0.8 everything would be done to make certain that the airplane was satisfactory in all aspects in the speed range up to Mach 0.8." Bell’s proposed program fell far short of meeting these requirements. "The mere flying of the airplane to a Mach number of 0.8 and making an 8 g pull-out," he explained, "is not considered suitable preparation for the research flying...Langley cannot operate and maintain the XS-1 and other airplanes needed for research testing and does not want its pilots to undertake the research flying on the XS-1 following such limited acceptance tests as Bell proposes." Under the circumstances, Reid recommended that the Army immediately start proceedings for a contract with the Bell Corporation for the operation, maintenance, repair and modification of the XS-1 airplane, as well as "for the research flying under NACA supervision." NACA headquarters rejected this proposal outright; it was not consistent with smart politics at a time when the NACA was campaigning for additional congressional funding for a proposed National Supersonic Research Center.

Nevertheless, flight researchers at Langley had cause to be concerned about safety. The transonic flight program would venture into a completely uncharted area. The potential risks were tragically highlighted less than a month after Jack Woolams' fatal accident when, on September 27, English test pilot Geoffrey de Havilland was killed during a practice flight in preparation for an attempt to set a new world speed record in the D.H. 108 Swallow. The experimental jet was flying in the dense lower atmosphere at only 7,500 feet when, as de Havilland attained a speed of 0.875 Mach, the airplane was subjected to a violent longitudinal pitching oscillation and literally disintegrated. The news was sobering, indeed. By that time, in fact, Great Britain had already abandoned its attempts to develop piloted supersonic research vehicles. Britain's director of Scientific Research for Air had noted at a press conference the preceding July that flying at speeds greater than sound "introduces new problems" and he conceded: "We do not yet know how serious they are. The impression that super-sonic aircraft are just around the corner is quite erroneous. But the difficulties will be tackled by the use of rocket-driven models. We have not the heart to ask pilots to fly the high-speed models, so we shall make them radio-controlled."

Three days after de Havilland’s accident, on September 30, Walt Williams and the initial cadre of NACA engineers and technicians arrived at Muroc and, although they did not realize it at the time, they were the first component of what would become a permanent NACA/NASA establishment at the base. Once again, as at Pinecastle, his unit would be responsible for instrumenting the airplanes, gathering and analyzing the data, and exerting as much influence as they could on the planning and conduct of the flight test program. That issue returned to the forefront almost immediately after the B-29 and XS-1 arrived, along with Bob Stanley, on the evening of October 7. The next day, Stanley announced that Bell planned to complete Goodlin’s first unpowered checkout flight on the morning of October 9. When Williams informed him that it would be impossible to instrument the aircraft because most of his technicians were not even scheduled to arrive until later that day, Stanley was anything but sympathetic. Finally, they took the issue to Major Clarence A. Shoop, who was the Air Materiel Command’s (AMC) representative for the XS-1 project at Muroc. Williams reported back to Mel Gough at Langley:

Ezra Kotcher had long since moved on to other projects and, unfortunately, instead of taking a stand and settling the issue, the AMC would continue to equivocate. In meetings with the principals, it continued to emphasize that time was of the essence. Funding was short and thus Bell was encouraged to proceed with all due speed. On the other hand, because the AMC still planned to transfer management control of the research pro-gram over to the NACA, it wanted the agency to be satisfied with the airplane before it was accepted --and this meant that Williams’ crew should be given adequate opportunity to instrument the XS-1 and to acquire sufficient data. While the AMC never did stipulate who should be in charge of the program, a very informal compromise was eventually hammered out. NACA and AMC officials ultimately settled on a total of approximately 20 contractor demonstration flights, during which both the Nos. 1 and 2 aircraft would be evaluated, as adequate for the NACA’s data-gathering purposes. Privately, Dick Frost informed Williams that "he would see that things worked out better for us" once Stanley departed for Buffalo. Indeed, even Stanley himself acknowledged as much when he conceded that "he was pushing the project faster than normal because his time [at Muroc] was limited."

Bell’s attempt to fly on October 9 came to naught. The launch had to be aborted when Goodlin was forced to jettison the cabin door because of a malfunctioning cabin pressure relief valve. Never one to stand idly by, Stanley himself pitched in and fixed the damaged door with a sledge hammer and Goodlin was able to complete his first unpowered checkout flight on October 11. After an uneventful flight, his first landing demonstrated the wisdom of selecting Muroc for the tests. He touched down about halfway down the 6,500-foot concrete runway and the brakes failed. The aircraft rolled out across the runway overrun onto the lake bed and continued to roll until it finally came to a stop nearly 8,000 feet from where it had touched down. Although pleased with the XS-1, in general, Goodlin reported that he had "considerably" over controlled the air-plane because of the lightness of its controls and he recommended that the friction in the control system should be increased. He completed another pair of glide flights over the following week during which he continued to encounter problems with the brakes as well as with the pressure regulators and various other systems. Stanley then called a halt to flight operations so these problems could be rectified and the B-29 could undergo a 100-hour maintenance checkout.

The hiatus gave Williams an opportunity to search, without much luck, for some decent housing for the NACA employees and to conduct some NACA business. He traveled to the Douglas facility in El Segundo, California, for example, to check  on the D-558 and was able to report that it was progressing well. Since his arrival at Muroc, he had been very much impressed by the extraordinary variety of new experimental prototypes which were undergoing tests at the base--from AAF prototypes, such as the XB-35, XB-43A, and XP-84 to a surprisingly large array of U.S. Navy aircraft, including the XFJ-1, XF6U, XF2R-1 and the gargantuan Lock-heed XR6O-1 Constitution. He reported that he had heard rumors--which proved to be accurate--that the AAF had a master plan to transform the ramshackle base into a major modern test installation and, after just a few weeks at the location, he could see why. The flying conditions were incomparable and the lake bed had already proven its value. In this out-of-the way, almost primeval location, he had caught a glimpse of the future. While the NACA had strongly resisted the idea of testing the XS-1 at Muroc, he predicted that the agency would probably "have a large group out here for a very long time." There were "no two ways about it," he explained to Mel Gough back at Langley, "this is the place to test experimental airplanes or, for that matter, any sort of airplane." Walt Williams proved to be a prophet.

The B-29 returned to Muroc on 20 November and Bob Stanley returned seven days later with news that Larry Bell was coming out to spend the first week of December. He was hell-bent to complete the first powered flight during Bell’s visit and, ignoring Dick Frost’s reservations about the readiness of the XS-1 for powered flight, he once again accelerated preparations into a frenzied, "hurry up" mode. "Stanley," Williams observed, "is a hard man to understand." Wryly, he noted that "‘The Great White Father’ as the Bell boys call him, from his performance Friday, you would expect to find him floating face down in the lake any morning if there was water in the lake." A humorous observation; however, the events which followed were anything but.

Stanley decided that only one more glide test was necessary in order to prepare for the first powered flight. This was to be a "ballast test." Bell technicians filled the fuel and liquid oxygen (lox) tanks with a water-alcohol solution to about 40-percent of their capacity. This increased the gross weight of the aircraft to about 8,700 pounds and it would permit Goodlin to test the fuel and lox jettison valves.

With Larry Bell, Stanley and a number of other dignitaries stationed in the control tower and Dick Frost flying chase in an FP-51, the B-29 took off from the main runway on December 2. During a preflight inspection, the ground crew had noticed that the XS-1's nosewheel would not lock in the up position. When mated to the B-29 with the XS-1's nose gear retracted, the clearance between the rocket plane and the ground during takeoff was less than one foot. If, for any reason, the B-29 had to land while still carrying the XS-1 and the gear should extend, it could well mean disaster. No one anticipated this, however, and Stanley gave orders to proceed with the flight. Well, the unanticipated did happen. As the B-29 was climbing toward launch altitude, a nitrogen pressure valve in the XS-1 malfunctioned. The lox tank could not be pressurized and thus its contents could not be jettisoned. The XS-1's landing gear was not designed to support a landing with the equivalent of 1,000 pounds of lox on board. All of the sudden, the nose gear ground clearance issue got everybody’s attention. There were only two alternatives, neither of which was very attractive: either jettison the XS-1 or attempt to land the B-29 with its cargo. Loss of the rocket plane would have dealt a devastating blow to the whole program and thus Stanley ultimately decided to proceed with the attempt to make the dangerous landing. Frost radio-ed Goodlin and recommended that he retract the nose gear just before the B-29 touched down. It would slowly return to the down position but, by the time it had completed its cycle, the B-29 would be safely on the ground on final rollout. Stanley, however, had difficulty visualizing Frost’s proposal and he ordered him to come down and explain it in person. All the while, the B-29 had been burning up fuel and its supply was running low. Fuming with rage, Frost landed his airplane, taxied to Base Ops, hopped out and, after he had carefully--and rather heatedly--explained the procedure, Stanley gave it his blessing. Frost then had to jump back into his airplane, climb back up to the B-29, and repeat his instructions to Goodlin. With Frost "talking him down" as he approached the runway, the young test pilot managed to retract the gear just as the B-29 was about to touch down and the XS-1 was saved to fly, believe it or not,.....yet again that very same day!

Remarkably, Stanley decided to reattempt the final glide flight that afternoon. The valve problem had been fixed...but nothing had been done to remedy the nosewheel uplock problem! Just prior to launch, Frost reported that the nose gear was once again inching its way downward. Undeterred, the Bell crew proceeded with the launch. There was a maxim, which has since earned wide notoriety as "Murphy’s Law," which was just then entering the vernacular of flight testers at Muroc: "If anything can go wrong, it will." And, in this instance, it most certainly did. When the launch mechanism was activated, nothing happened. After several at-tempts from the B-29's cockpit had failed, XS-1 crew chief Mac Hamil-ton finally crawled back into the bomb bay and manually operated the release mechanism. Good fortune smiled and, after achieving a clean separation, Goodlin jettisoned the contents of the tanks and made a safe landing. It had been a most eventful day for Slick Goodlin but, unphased and impatient to get on with the pro-gram, he recommended that the next mission should be a powered flight.

That moment of truth occurred on December 9, when Goodlin and the rocket plane dropped away from the B-29 at 27,000 feet. As the craft plummeted with its full load of fuel, Goodlin waited about ten seconds to ignite the first cylinder of his engine. Never employing more than two of the cylinders, he climbed to 35,000 feet and effortlessly achieved a top speed of Mach 0.795. Then he cut off all power and dove to 15,000 feet where, pulling up into a climb, he momentarily ignited all four chambers of the engine and instantaneously felt a "terrific acceleration." He also heard what he later described as an "ungodly howl." Correctly assuming this to be the result of a lean fuel mix entering the engine, he immediately shut down all four chambers. Then he noticed a fire-warning light on his instrument panel. Dick Frost was too far behind to give him a visual confirmation of any evidence of fire and, from his position on the ground, Stanley told Goodlin to jettison all of his remaining propellants and come on down. There had, indeed, been a small engine fire which burned some wiring and instrumentation. But, apart from that and a slight lateral snaking motion caused by fuel sloshing, Bell considered the first powered flight to be quite successful and Goodlin judged the handling characteristics of the XS-1 to be very good.

Immediately after this flight, Bob Stanley returned to Buffalo and, following repairs to the XS-1's engine bay, the testing proceeded at a steady but somewhat less accelerated pace. The purpose of 

the contractor program was to develop the airplane and its systems to a level of performance and reliability which would be acceptable to the AAF and the NACA. Thus Bell engineers and technicians were forced to spend a considerable amount of time isolating the causes of problems encountered during each flight and then devising workable engineering solutions to remedy them. And, good as his word, Dick Frost made every attempt to satisfy the NACA’s data requirements as Goodlin flew most of the data points requested by Williams. All of this required painstaking effort and it took time. Nevertheless, by the end of February 1947, Goodlin had completed 12 powered flights in the No. 2 aircraft and, meeting Bell's contractual requirements, he had attained a top speed of Mach 0.828 and had demonstrated the structural rugged-ness of the craft by completing pullups in excess of 8g’s at speeds ranging from 0.4 to 0.8 Mach. Although engine and fuel pressurization problems had plagued the program, and would continue to cause problems, Bell had also satisfactorily demonstrated the full-power performance of the rocket engine. In order to fulfill all of its requirements, however, the company had to complete a total of 20 powered flights, including at least five flights in each airplane. The No. 1 airplane, with its thin eight-percent wings and six-percent tail, arrived at Muroc in early April and, after a single glide flight, Goodlin completed its first powered flight on April 11. Between that date and June 5, he completed six additional flights in this airplane and the No. 2 vehicle was launched two more times, including a single familiarization flight which was made by Bell’s new chief test pilot, Alvin M. "Tex" Johnston. Altogether, Bell completed a total 15 glide and 22 powered flights in order to bring the company's airworthiness demonstration to a satisfactory conclusion.

Although he had not been able to acquire all of the data he had hoped for, even Walt Williams was satisfied that the NACA had sufficient information on the two airplanes to proceed with the research program. And even though NACA test pilot Joel Baker, who had been assigned to thoroughly inspect the rocket plane and observe the Bell tests, had a long list of reservations about various features of the XS-1, he had concluded that it "could be used in its present configuration as a transonic research vehicle." Everything appeared to be in readiness for the onset of the research program and the assault on Mach 1. There was one major issue, however, which still had to be resolved: who was going to fly the airplane?

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