The issue of who was going to attempt to exceed the speed of sound had remained in doubt almost from the inception of the XS-1 program. Initially, the program had been predicated on the assumption that, after Bell had completed the acceptance flights, the airplanes would be turned over to the NACA for the research phase of the testing. Early on, however, Bob Stanley had started lobbying for Bell to receive a contract to fly the supersonic program and, as early as May 1945, Colonel George Smith had informed NACA headquarters that it was the "intention" of the Engineering Division to place a separate contract with Bell to complete those flights. Whether this information was ever relayed to flight researchers at Langley remains in doubt, however, because they proceeded with plans to conduct their own kind of transonic flight research program. The major issue for them, however, was never really who would fly the airplane so much as it was who would exercise control over the program. Thus, the following October, Mel Gough informed Bob Stanley that the NACA planned to take over control of the research program and it would fly the XS-1 "until such time as the aircraft evidenced characteristics that made it uncontrollable and extremely hazardous to fly. At that time a contract may be negotiated to fly the airplane at higher speeds." While Colonel Smith basically concurred with this, he subsequently imposed at least one very noteworthy condition. In April 1946, he informed NACA headquarters that the agency would conduct the high-speed flight research program and that it would be expected to fly beyond the range of safety. If the NACA was unwilling to fly in that regime, however, the aircraft would be returned to AAF jurisdiction. That final stipulation was, no doubt, somewhat troubling to the NACA for it at least implied loss of control over the research program.

While most NACA researchers had been less than enthusiastic about the XS-1--and its primary objective as defined by the AAF--and, while the agency had repeatedly gone on record that it did not want its pilots to perform any of the "extra hazardous" flights, it did want its pilots to fly the airplanes within safe limits and it most certainly wanted to maintain control over the planning and conduct of the transonic research program. Looking toward this eventuality, in June of 1946, Walt Williams drafted a proposed research flight pro-gram. In keeping with NACA practice, it was designed to gather extremely detailed data on stability and control, aerodynamic loads, drag and performance. This was to be accomplished in two phases. During the first, which would define what Williams called the "operational limits of the airplane," the NACA would "progress in definite Mach number increments such as 0.83, 0.86, 0.89" to acquire complete data on the stability and control characteristics of the airplane as well as sufficient data from strain-gauge instrumentation to establish an adequate level of confidence concerning aerodynamic loads. The second phase would focus on a detailed investigation of spanwise and chordwise aerodynamic loads on the wings and tail through the use of very precise pressure-distribution instruments (manometers). Because the "operational limits" of the airplane would be defined during the initial phase, it was really the most critical. Concerning it, he explained:

Forty-eight flights with a highly experimental research airplane was a very sizeable number in and of itself. However, a "successful flight" would be one in which all systems on board the aircraft functioned properly, the pilot was able to fly the prescribed profile precisely as planned, and all of the data acquisition, transmission and recording equipment functioned as designed. Historically, the chances for all of these variables to fall into place according to plan were about 50-50. Thus, 48 successful flights might well require over 100 missions. On top of this, Williams had suggested that, if they ran into difficulties, it might "be necessary to expand the test program and investigate the difficulties in detail and the number of flights will, of course, be increased." He had outlined a flight test program that might well require a year or more to complete and yet, not once in this very detailed test plan, did he specifically address the issue of attempting to exceed the speed of sound. When this plan was passed along to the Engineering Division at Wright Field, it must have raised more than a few eyebrows.

Meanwhile, Bob Stanley proceeded with Bell plans to take over the high-speed program. In mid-September, he met with Goodlin to discuss compensation for an extended series of flights which would ultimately carry the XS-1 through the sound barrier. They ultimately came to a "hand-shake agreement" that Bell would issue him--or a corporation formed in his name--a contract which would pay Goodlin a total of $150,000 spread out over a period of five years. At this point in time, although no one in the NACA or certainly the AMC knew anything about this agreement, it appeared that all sides might be inclined to let Bell take on the job. On October 14, 1946, NACA and AMC officials gathered at Wright Field to discuss the research program and, as Hartley Soule reported to the LMAL Chief of Research: "it was agreed that the flying of the XS-1 airplane for the research tests is extra hazardous and probably that it could be done most fairly by contracting for the pilot’s services." There was one very important drawback to this approach, however. When the AMC proposed that the NACA undertake the negotiation of a contract for the research flights, both sides learned that neither had the funding to pay for it.

In the postwar drawdown, AAF budgets had been slashed to the bone and much of the ambitious research and development program the service had planned, in order to capitalize on technological revolution spawned by the recent war, had to be shelved. Thus the AMC's research and development budget was severely limited. The budget for the entire XS-1 program, for example, totaled only $4,371,560 (as of December 1947) and its funding for fiscal 1948 was limited to $192,000 (indeed, the AMC's entire R&D budget for all of the many programs it would 

manage in 1948 came to only $29,175,000). For the time being, at least, this circumstance also shelved any plan to hire a contractor to conduct the XS-1 research program. Indeed, it appeared to have taken the program back to square one. On February 6, 1947, AAF, AMC and NACA officials formally agreed that the NACA would furnish the flight and maintenance crews for the XS-1 and, indeed, all upcoming X-plane pro-grams. While he had been a party to this agreement, Colonel Smith was none too comfortable with it. Indeed, he had other concerns on his mind in addition to the issue of funding as he prepared for an important upcoming meeting with Bob Stanley and NACA officials to discuss the current status and future direction of the program.

That conference was held at Wright Field, on March 5, and Stanley was none too pleased with the proceedings. The whole issue of whether Bell had satisfactorily met its contractual requirements for the initial acceptance program--and, more critically, whether or not the NACA would accept the airplane--was still unresolved. The NACA had expressed reservations about the XS-1 since the original design concept meetings and, while the current flight test program had revealed no serious flaws, it soon became apparent that Mel Gough was still not eager to have his pilots fly the airplane. Stanley reported back to Bell officials, afterwards, that "Mr. Gough was as timorous as an old maid as regards ‘putting his stamp of approval’ on the airplane by accepting it...He finally reluctantly admitted that it complied with the specification but...he thought that the specification was loosely written." Stanley was equally skeptical about the NACA’s approach to the research program:

I was rather disturbed in the conference by a statement made by [Hartley] Soule [of the LMAL] that they weren't interested in the third airplane (with the turbine pump) because they could get all they wanted out of the present airplane. This, of course, means that they have taken a defeatist attitude in ever going to sonic or super-sonic speed and hence are not interested in the additional 800 m.p.h. which the turbine pump will give them. I have heard from several sources that they are more or less marking time until they can get hold of the Douglas D-558 and they are only slightly interested in the XS-1. This may be an extreme view but I believe it is partially true. As far as I can determine from several pointed questions which I asked yesterday, they will use the XS-1 no more effectively than they could the P-80 or P-84 since they are going to fly it at low altitudes up until they encounter trim change and/or buffeting and then they will stop. At these low altitudes, they could do the same with a P-84 since it reaches Mach No. trouble at part throttle.

Stanley had not given up hope that Bell would be issued a follow-on contract and he argued, apparently in vain, that his company should be permitted to fly one of the airplanes in an accelerated program to "run interference" for the NACA and define the envelope "in advance of their detailed research." This suggestion, he reported, "was not well received by NACA and the Army politely murmured 'We don't have the funds.'" Nevertheless, for the first time, Stanley’s proposal introduced the notion that the best way to proceed might be by breaking the XS-1 program up into two roughly parallel phases, one aimed at achieving supersonic flight as quickly as possible and the other at collecting detailed transonic data.

After the conference broke up, Stanley continued to press his case in a private meeting with Colonel Smith and his deputy, Colonel Osmond J. "Ozzie" Ritland. "I explained in some detail my views concerning the public relations situation," he reported, "the general tempo of the program under NACA, our company reputation as probably hand-led by the press when they learn that Goodlin was no longer going to fly the XS-1, and the probable wrath of General Spaatz as to the arrangement that had been decided upon." He reported that he "found Colonel Smith most attentive, very courteous, and quite agreeable but also quite troubled." In Ritland, however, he found an apparent ally. He had served as a test pilot at Wright Field throughout most of the war and "was quite familiar with the NACA flight test personnel and methods." Stanley reported that Ritland said: "There is no doubt that NACA will do a thorough flight test job but they will take forever." After much discussion, Stanley reported, "Colonel Smith finally intimated that the question of funds was not the real question but it was one involving the danger of offending NACA and the political repercussions of same." Smith was facing quite a dilemma. In point of fact, funding was a critical issue. Moreover, the NACA still held the charter for the conduct of fundamental aeronautical research activities in this country and, despite the recent damage to its reputation, the agency still had very powerful allies in Washington. Smith also realized, however, that Larry Bell also had top-level connections in Washington, among them the Commanding General of the USAAF, General Carl Spaatz, and that Stanley’s mention of his name was not just an idle threat. As he had in the past, Larry Bell could be expected to go over everyone’s head and take the issue all the way to the top. Ultimately, Smith reopened the door for Bell by offering Stanley some off-the-record advice. "He felt that the AAF was powerless to sponsor such a program," Stanley reported, "unless initiated by the NACA and suggested that unofficially and without his sponsorship we approach Dr. Lewis [NACA Director of Aero-nautical Research] on the basis of our willingness to perform this very hazardous function with the goal of beating a safe path for their research."

With General Craigie, Larry Bell and Stanley in attendance, the proposed meeting was held in George Lewis’ office on March 21. Intent on selling his proposal, Stanley understated the scope of the Bell plan considerably when he indicated that the company’s "program would be brief with only a few flights culminating in an attempt to fly through Mach number one." General Craigie indicated that the AMC would attempt to find a way to fund such an effort if the NACA would continue to support the program and provide Bell with instrumentation and engineering assistance. Placed in an awkward position, Lewis apparently felt he had little choice but to agree with the proposal. It appeared that the program had taken yet another 180-degree turn.

Stanley may have sold the Bell program on the basis of its being "brief" and requiring only "a few flights" prior to the assault on Mach 1 but that was not the program that he would formally submit to AMC for approval. Back at Muroc, Walt Williams reported that, when Dick Frost informed them of the decision to give Bell the program, he "stated that unofficially Stanley had said that the program would last a minimum of thirty weeks and possibly sixty weeks with a program entailing probably fifty or sixth [sixty] flights." Such a program, Williams wryly observed, seemed "quite lengthy." If Bell could get past Mach 1 in 10-15 flights, then its program would serve a useful purpose but, if the company was going to take 50 or 60 flights to do it, "then their program is unnecessary since the NACA in fifty flights or so will have proved whether or not XS-1 can fly faster than the speed of sound, if the original program which I wrote last year is followed."

Williams was not alone in this observation. At Wright Field, George Smith had come to a similar conclusion. When Bell submitted its formal proposal, it called for a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract with no specifics regarding the length of the pro-gram nor any guarantee of results. The potential length of the program, General Smith later recalled, was "excessive" and the cost was "exorbitant." Moreover, a tight-fisted fiscal conservative, he was absolutely outraged when he saw a graph depicting Stanley’s proposed payment schedule to Slick Goodlin. The AAF could not and, so far as Smith was concerned, absolutely would not provide the funds to underwrite such an enormous pilot bonus contract. Thus the AMC responded with a proposal for a fixed price contract which would carefully stipulate, in advance, what Bell would accomplish during the tests. In essence, Smith offered Bell a contract which he was fairly confident the company could not accept. Thus the program appeared to have taken yet another turn. The obvious answer would have been to return the whole program back to the NACA. Yet Smith had some misgivings.

Bob Stanley’s arguments concerning the NACA at the March 5 meeting had not fallen on deaf ears. Smith and Ritland had already conducted meetings with NACA personnel and they were not comfortable with what they were hearing. They, too, had detected a certain skepticism on the NACA's part, particularly in the comments of Hartley Soule who repeatedly expressed doubts about the XS-1's ability to transit the transonic region en route to Mach 1. At the very least, it seemed apparent to them that the NACA would proceed with extreme caution and probably consume a lot of time before it attempted to make an actual assault on Mach 1. After all, the test plan submitted by Williams would take at least a year to complete and it had never directly addressed the issue of breaching the sonic wall. From the Army Air Force's point of view, however, achieving Mach 1 in the shortest possible time was--as it had always been--the primary objective of the XS-1 program. It appeared to Smith and Ritland that the NACA did not have much enthusiasm for that specific goal--or, at best, had put it somewhere on the back burner. For the AAF, however, the issue was more than academic...or even economic. The AMC had fighter aircraft in near-term development, such as the sweptwing XF-86, which promised to nudge precariously close to the supersonic region. Thus the AAF had an immediate and very critical requirement to determine whether or not supersonic flight would pose unacceptable risks.

The more they discussed the matter between themselves, the more they began to consider what, at the time, was a truly unusual alternative: to permit the AMC's Flight Test Division to take over responsibility for the accelerated research program. Though this represented a radical departure from long-established custom, it offered the benefits of avoiding the cost of a program conducted by Bell and, by giving AMC personnel day-to-day, hands-on control of the operation, it would insure that the AAF’s primary objective would be pursued in earnest and without delay. Moreover, based on his first-hand experience, Ozzie Ritland had a great deal of confidence in the capabilities of the Flight Test Division and the pilots assigned to it. Having served as deputy chief of flight test at Wright Field in 1943-44, he was intimately familiar with a pair of developments which had come to fruition late in the war years.

To understand them, it is necessary to look at what had transpired over the previous two decades. The Army had once boasted a truly impressive flight test capability. Back in the early 20s, the Army test pilots who flew at old McCook Field, in Dayton, Ohio, were regarded as true professionals--indeed, as among the very best in the business. Aviation pioneers such as Lieutenants James H. "Jimmy" Doolittle and John A. Macready regularly engaged in the full range of flight test activities, from major flight research projects to the extensive developmental testing of new prototypes. All of this changed after Congress passed the Air Corps Act of 1926. The act expressly forbade the Air Corps’ involvement in the design and development of its own airplanes and, at the same time, Congress noted that fundamental flight research was a part of the NACA’s charter and that military efforts in that realm would constitute an unnecessary and wasteful duplication of capabilities which would no longer be tolerated. From that point through the early years of World War II, Army test pilots found their role increasingly restricted as NACA pilots gained a virtual monopoly on research flying while contractor pilots increasingly performed the lion’s share of envelope expansion and other develop-mental tests on new aircraft proposed for the military inventory. Under these circumstances, Army test pilots were essentially relegated to performing brief acceptance flight test programs which were confined to little more than spot-checking a contractor’s data in order to confirm its integrity. No longer regarded as true professionals, they were more or less consigned to a second-class status. While this system had functioned adequately during the prewar years, such complete dependence on the NACA and the contractors proved to be an Achilles’ heel during the crisis of war as the AAF found itself unable to acquire the kind and volume of data it needed to make timely and well-informed decisions regarding major weapons systems. As deputy chief of flight test, Ozzie Ritland had been among those who had lobbied long and hard within the AAF for the establishment of a legitimate high-speed flight research capability within the Flight Section (the forerunner of the Flight Test Division which would be constituted in early 1945). This effort finally bore fruit when a Flight Research Branch, with its own dedicated engineers and test pilots, was established in late 1944.

The viability of this new capability was based, to a considerable extent, upon the implementation of yet another initiative with which Ritland was equally familiar. For he had also been among those who were involved in the effort to establish a formal test pilots’ school at Wright Field. This institution, initially established as the Air Technical Service Command Flight Test Training Unit in September of 1944, was the forerunner of the present-day U.S. Air Force Test Pilot School. Its purpose, from the outset, was to insure the implementation of standardized flight test methodologies and to transform outstanding stick-and-rudder men into professional engineering test pilots--pilots who would have both the talents and the knowledge necessary to engage in any type of flight test program. And, by the spring of 1947, as he and Smith were discussing the future of the XS-1 pro-gram, Ozzie Ritland was confident that it had already achieved that purpose. Army Air Forces test pilots were, in his view, more than capable of meeting the challenge and he recommended that Colonel Smith turn the accelerated supersonic program over to the AMC’s Flight Test Division.

In an age when the research and development business was conducted a lot more "informally" than it is today, Colonel Smith was remarkably free to make the decision himself without having to go through a lengthy chain of command to higher Army Air Forces headquarters. Thus, not long after the March 5th conference with Bell and NACA officials, he simply called Colonel Albert Boyd, the indomitable chief of the Flight Test Division at Wright Field, and asked him if his people could conduct the accelerated test program. Enthusiastically, he replied: "You bet!" Boyd was eager to prove that the military--and especially his test pilots--could successfully conduct a highly experimental research program.

Born in Rankin, Tennessee, in 1906, Boyd has justifiably been called "the father" of modern Air Force flight testing. Tough and absolutely unyielding in his demand for excellence, he had assumed command of the Flight Test Division in October of 1945. From the outset, he had energetic-ally pursued the expansion of the flight research mission and, more than any other individual, he had transformed the new test pilot school into an institution which would set industry-wide standards for the profession. Under his always stern and reportedly "omniscient" glare, only the very best pilots--those who had already convincingly demonstrated their discipline, objectivity, precision flying skills, and love for the job--were even permitted to enter the school in the first place. But this was only a part of the winnowing process. After graduation, those who did not continue to meet those standards were unceremoniously weeded out. By 1947, he was confident that he had built up his cadre of professionals and he was just waiting for the opportunity for them to prove their worth. The XS-1 program seemed to offer the best of all possible opportunities.

However, while the offer had been made and the Flight Test Division commenced its planning, the final decision on whether or not it would actually get the program hung in the balance for more than two months. As Colonel Smith had expected, Bell was unwilling to take on a fixed-price contract and, on May 1, 1947, he sent the following message to headquarters USAAF:

The Bell Aircraft Corporation has formally notified the Air Materiel Command that they consider it inadvisable to accept the highly experimental transonic flight test program on the XS-1 airplane on a fixed cost basis. As a result of this notification, discussion is now underway with [the] view of having this program taken over by AMC Flight Test Division.

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